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Abstract
Consider real assets and bank deposits. If returns on deposits improve due to
reduction in ﬁnancial repression, then investment in real assets can fall. However,
if role of black money in real asset (secondary) market falls, then investment in
the primary market can rise. So ﬁnancial development will occur if the eﬀect of
reduction in ﬁnancial repression is stronger than that of reduction of black money.
This is shown in a model, with forced sales (due to liquidity shock), and strategic
sales of real assets (under asymmetric information). Under some conditions, price
is irrelevant for strategic trades.
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This paper examines the allocation between real assets (RAs) and ﬁnancial
assets (FAs). For households, important RAs and FAs are real estate and
bank deposits respectively. In our model, we focus on the role of ﬁnancial
repression and the use of black money in determining the allocation between
real assets and ﬁnancial assets. This paper is motivated by reﬂections on the
Indian economy. However, it may be applicable to other emerging economies
as well.
Financial repression refers to the excessive or inappropriate controls
in the ﬁnancial sector. This is prevalent to a greater extent in emerging
economies than in developed countries (McKinnon, 1973, and Shaw, 1973).
This may help explain why the ratio of RAs to FAs in emerging economies is
higher than that in developed countries. If, in future, we witness a reduction
in ﬁnancial repression, then, investment in FAs can increase.
The real estate market in some emerging economies has a problem. Trade
in the secondary market involves black money (income/wealth which is il-
legal, or where taxes are evaded). This is well documented in the case of
India2, but this may be true for many other emerging economies. Ex-ante,
this can discourage investment in real estate in the primary market for many
people. However, with increasing globalization, improvements in regulation,
enforcement of tax laws, etc., the role of black money may fall over time. If
it does, then there is an interesting implication. Investment in real estate in
the primary market can rise in future.
It follows that there are two opposing eﬀects on investment in FAs. While
2More than 50 percent of the value transacted in the secondary market for real estate
in Mumbai is made in black money (Jha, 1999).
2a reduction in ﬁnancial repression can increase investment in FAs, a reduc-
tion in the use of black money can decrease it. So investment in FAs will
increase in emerging economies, if the ﬁrst eﬀect is stronger than the second.
While the eﬀect of a reduction in ﬁnancial repression is straightforward, the
eﬀect of a decrease in the role of black money is not well understood.
In case of real estate, it may seem that an investor can eliminate the
unique risk. But typically there is a fear of encroachment, if enforcement of
rights is weak, real estate is located far away, and the market for delegated
monitoring of RAs does not exist. Hence, there is risk in investment in
real estate, even if there is no market risk. The primary market is where
an investor buys a ‘new’ asset from a ﬁrm that is engaged in real estate
development. The secondary market is where transactions in ‘old’ assets
take place with considerable use of black money. For simplicity, we will
assume that only black money is used in the secondary market for RAs. In
contrast, transactions in the primary market are far more transparent. For
simplicity, we assume that only white money3 is used in the primary market
for RAs.
FAs include assets traded in ﬁnancial markets, and bank deposits. Since
the participation of households in ﬁnancial markets is small in emerging
economies, we consider only bank deposits as FAs. Return for depositors
is certain4. However, it is assumed to be lower than the expected return
on real estate. One reason is ﬁnancial repression. For comparison with the
RA market, we will, henceforth, refer to investment in a bank deposit as a
purchase of FA in the primary market, and any early redemption of a bank
3White money is opposite of black money.
4This may be due to a diversiﬁed portfolio, capital adequacy, deposit insurance, and
so on.
3deposit5 as a sale in the secondary market. In the case of transactions in
banks, which are far more transparent than in the case of RAs, both the
primary market and the secondary markets involve white money. This leads
to segmented secondary markets, since RA market involves black money, and
FA market involves white money.
After investing in the primary market, some agents may be hit by a
liquidity shock, and so they need to sell in the secondary market before the
projects ‘mature’. Others can wait. However, these others may be able to
sell RAs strategically, if there is asymmetric information6 on RAs. After
selling, they may buy any other asset, if secondary markets are integrated.
However, if secondary market in RAs involves black money, which cannot
be used in FA market, then the markets become segmented. An agent who
sells in one market cannot buy in another market. We will show that, under
integrated markets, a bad RA is sold to buy a safe FA, whereas, under
segmented markets, a bad RA is sold to buy another RA, which may be
good or bad. Ex-ante, this leads to greater investment in RAs in the primary
market, if secondary markets are integrated than if they are segmented.
The literature on ﬁnancial development is extensively surveyed in Levine
(2003). Financial repression and tax evasion (or, black money in our pa-
per) are discussed in Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995). However, their
model links these with growth and inﬂation. The model here builds on
5Usually an early redemption of a bank deposit is associated with bank runs. This
paper, however, abstracts from this aspect completely.
6One rationale for asymmetric information is that a clear legal title to a real asset is
often a problem in an emerging economy. The seller may know the weaknesses in the
legal documents and de-facto possession of property, which the buyer does not know.
Interestingly, in some extreme cases, the seller is not the owner at all!
4Singh (2005), which has some similarities with Diamond and Dybvig (1983)7.
Singh (2005) compared portfolio choice under symmetric information (SI)
with that under asymmetric information (AI). In our model, we compare
the case of integrated markets with that of segmented markets, given AI on
quality of RA and AI on type of agent.
Plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we describe the model.
Section 3 compares the case of integrated markets with that of segmented
markets. Section 4 includes a discussion. We conclude in section 5.
2 The Model
There is a continuum of agents in [0,1]. Each agent has an endowment of
one unit at date 0, and a portfolio choice between RA and FA in the primary
market. Both assets give returns at date 1 only.
RA yields a risky return, R, where R = R if the RA is good, and R = R
if the RA is bad, and 0 < R < R < ∞. Assume that RA is good with
probability β, and it is bad with probability (1−β), where 0 < β < 1. Here
β is also the proportion of projects that will give a return R. If Re and Rv
denote mean and variance of R respectively, then clearly
Re = βR + (1 − β)R, and (1)
Rv = β[R − Re]2 + (1 − β)[R − Re]2 = β(1 − β)(4R)2, (2)
where the last equality follows after using (1) and 4R ≡ R − R. FA gives
certain return of (Re − m), where 0 < m < Re. In section 4, we discuss at
length why m is positive.
7Diamond and Dybvig (1983) deals with bank runs. However, Singh (2005) does not
deal with bank runs at all. The similarity between the two papers lies in using liquidity
shock and asymmetric information.
5Agents are identical at date 0. At date Z, there are two types of agents
- type 1 and type 2. They need to consume at date Z and at date 1 respec-
tively. Date Z lies between date 0 and date 1. For simplicity, it is ﬁxed close
to date 1. This enables us to assume zero discount rate. Agents can sell their
assets at date Z in the secondary market. We now introduce another group
of agents who buy at date Z. These buyers are all identical, have ‘deep
pockets’ at date Z, are risk neutral, and have zero discount rate. They use
their endowment to buy assets at date Z, or use storage technology. Some
of these agents (who have black money) operate in the RA market, whereas
others (who have white money) operate in the FA market. The only role of
risk neutral agents is that they buy assets at date Z. Henceforth, our focus
will be on risk-averse agents, and unless otherwise speciﬁed, an agent will
mean a risk-averse agent.
At date 0, agents do not know their type. However, they know that
t proportion of agents will be type 1 agents. At date Z, each agent gets
private information on her own type and on the quality of her RA. At date
Z, there can be four types of agents viz. 1G, 1B, 2G and 2B. Agent
ij is a type i agent (i = 1,2), who has an RA that has quality j, where
j = G,B. G (B) denotes an agent with a good (bad) project. Assume
that the type of an agent is independent of the quality of RA. It follows
that the probability of states 1G, 1B, 2G and 2B are tβ, t(1−β), (1−t)β,
and (1 − t)(1 − β) respectively. This is regardless of whether markets are
integrated or segmented. An RA can be sold under AI. In case of FAs,
investments are diversiﬁed, and both sellers and buyers know the average
quality of projects. So we have SI on FAs.
At date Z, risk neutral agents are potential buyers of assets and type 1
agents are the sellers of assets. We will see that another group of traders
6can be type 2B agents. Assume that agents settle their net position.
Wherever required, we will use the subscript k, where k = I,S, and I
and S stand for for the cases of integrated markets and segmented markets
respectively. Assume that markets are competitive and transactions costs
are zero. Let Pr denote the price of an RA at date Z (there is no trade at
date 1). Let Y r denote the return on RA. Given the need to consume at
date Z, type 1 agents sell their assets. Hence, Y r = Pr, if agent is type 1.
We will later see how Pr is determined. In the case of FA,
P
f
k = Re − m, k = I,S. (3)
This is because in each case, at date 1, there is a certain return of (Re−m),
and, at date Z, FA is traded under SI in a competitive market, the buyers of
assets have ‘adequate endowment’, zero discount rate, and access to storage
technology. In each case, type 2 agents retain their FAs till date 1. Let a and
Y denote the investment in RA, and the return on portfolio respectively. So
Y = aY r + (1 − a)(Re − m). (4)
Let ρ denote absolute risk aversion. Let W denote expected utility. Further,
let E[Y ] and V [Y ] denote the mean of Y , and the variance of Y respectively.
For convenience, assume that W = E[Y ] − 1
2ρV [Y ]. From the discussion so
far,
W = aE[Y r] + (1 − a)(Re − m) −
1
2
ρa2V [Y r]. (5)
Assume that 0 ≤ a ≤ 1. We now turn to a comparison of integrated markets
and segmented markets.
73 Integrated Markets and Segmented Markets
First, we study the behavior of agents and pricing of assets in the secondary
markets, for a given portfolio choice (subsection 3.1). Thereafter, we will
consider the portfolio choice in the primary market (subsection 3.2).
3.1 Secondary Markets
At date Z, agents realize whether they are type 1 or type 2. The former need
to consume at date Z, and so participate in forced sales of all their assets.
Type 2 agents do not need to consume at date Z. Indeed, type 2G agents
will retain their assets till date 1. Action of type 1 and type 2G agents
does not depend on whether or not markets are integrated. However, type
2B agents can participate in strategic sales of their RAs under AI, and buy
other assets in the secondary market. If RA and FA markets are integrated,
then a type 2B agent can choose to buy RA or FA. However, if markets are
segmented, then a type 2B agent can buy RA only.
The following analysis applies whether markets are integrated or seg-
mented. The supply of bad RAs comes from both type 1 and type 2B agents.
Therefore, the total supply of bad RAs at date Z is a(1−β)t+a(1−β)(1−t) =
a(1−β), given an investment of a in RA at date 0. The supply of good RAs
comes from type 1 agents only. Therefore, total supply of good RAs is aβt.
Note that the total supply of RAs is a[1 − β + βt]. Thus,
β0 =
βt
1 − β + βt
,
where β0 denotes the conditional probability that an RA is of good quality,
conditional on the event that it is put up for sale in the market. Let R0
denote the conditional expected return on an RA. Given the characteristics
8of the risk neutral buyers and the market, we have
Pr = R0 = β0R + (1 − β0)R. (6)
Observe that price in the two cases is the same. Intuition is that quality is
same.
Let us now see where the two cases of integrated markets and segmented
markets diﬀer. It follows from concavity that a type 2B agent will buy FA
under integrated markets at date Z. Under segmented markets, this is not
possible but an agent can buy another RA. The expected utility of a type
2B agent, who sells her RA at price Prs




















R + (1 − a)(Re − m)

= β0u(aR + (1 − a)(Re − m)) + (1 − β0)u(aR + (1 − a)(Re − m))(7)
> u(aR + (1 − a)(Re − m)), (8)
where the last expression is the utility of a type 2B agent who retains her
RA, the equality follows from Prs
S = Prb
S , and the inequality follows from
the assumption R < R, and from the condition 0 < β0 < 1 (this is easy to
check).
Given the behavior of agents at date Z, it follows that Y r
I for type 1
agents is Pr
I = R0, Y r
I for type 2G is R, and Y r






(Re − m) = R0, after using (3) and (6).
Consider the probability density function (pdf) of Y r
S. There are 4 states
of the world - 1G, 1B, 2G and 2B. Within the fourth state, now there are
two sub-states - 2BG and 2BB. A type 2BG (2BB) is a type 2B agent
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Table 1: Probability density function (pdf) of Y r
S
who sells her bad RA and buys another RA, which turns out to be good
(bad). Given independence, the probabilities of these two sub-states are
(1 − t)(1 − β)β0 and (1 − t)(1 − β)(1 − β0) respectively. Given the behavior
of agents at date Z, it follows that the pdf of Y r
S is as given in Table 1.
Proposition 1 If k = S, it pays to switch from one RA to another ∀ Pr.
Proof: The result follows from (7) and (8). ||
Under segmented markets, price does not matter because a type 2B
agent is both a seller and a buyer of RA. This is diﬀerent from the case








Re−m), and from the usual models of AI (e.g. Akerlof (1970)).
3.2 Primary Markets
An agent can choose any portfolio at date 0. However, an agent needs to
keep in mind whether or not the secondary markets will be integrated. So
10there are 2 cases - k = I,S. Given the pdf of Y r
I , it is easy to check that8
E[Y r
I ] = tR0 + (1 − t)βR + (1 − t)(1 − β)R0 = Re, (9)
V [Y r
I ] = t(R0 − Re)2 + (1 − t)β(R − Re)2 +
(1 − t)(1 − β)(R0 − Re)2 = Rv(1 − t)(1 − β0). (10)
Given the pdf of Y r
S, it follows that
E[Y r
S] = tR0 + (1 − t)βR + (1 − t)(1 − β)[β0R + (1 − β0)R]
= tR0 + (1 − t)βR + (1 − t)(1 − β)R0 = Re, (11)
where second and third equalities follow from (6) and (9) respectively, and
V [Y r
S] = t(R0 − Re)2 + (1 − t)β(R − Re)2 +
(1 − t)(1 − β)

β0(R − Re)2 + (1 − β0)(R − Re)2

= t(R0 − Re)2 + (1 − t)β(R − Re)2 +
(1 − t)(1 − β)

β0(R − R0)2 + (1 − β0)(R − R0)2 + (R0 − Re)2

= Rv(1 − t)(1 − β0) +
(1 − t)(1 − β)

β0(R − R0)2 + (1 − β0)(R − R0)2

= Rv(1 − t)(1 − β0) + (1 − t)(1 − β)β0(1 − β0)(4R)2
= Rv(1 − t)(1 − β0) + (1 − t)(1 − β)β0(1 − β0)
Rv
β(1 − β)







where the second equality follows from simple algebra and (6), the third
equality follows from (10), the fourth equality follows from (the second part
of) (6) and 4R ≡ R − R, the ﬁfth equality from (2), and the last equality
follows with simple algebra.
8For more details, see case (3) in Singh (2005).









, k = I,S. (13)
after using E[Y r
I ] = E[Y r
S] = Re (see (9) and (11)), and m > 0. Note that
W∗
k = Wk(a∗






Re − m + m2
2ρV [Y r
k ], if 0 < m < ρV [Y r




2 , if ρV [Y r
k ] ≤ m, k = I,S.
(14)
We can now state our next formal result.
Proposition 2 (a) Assume that 0 < m < ρV [Y r






∂m > 0 and
∂W∗
k
∂m < 0, k = I,S, and (b) W∗
S < W∗
I .
Proof: (a) It follows from (10) and (12) that V [Y r
I ] < V [Y r
S], after using











I(m) < 1, if 0 < m < ρV [Y r
I ]. (15)
It is easy to check that the comparative statics results hold. (b) It is very
easy to check that if 0 < m < ρV [Y r
I ], or if ρV [Y r




I ] ≤ m < ρV [Y r
S], then it follows from (14) that
W∗




I ] ≥ Re −
m
2






The ﬁrst part of Proposition 2(a) states that investment in RA in the
primary market depends on whether secondary markets are integrated or
segmented. Formally, a∗
S < a∗
I, given an interior solution in each case. The
intuition is as follows. At date Z, RAs can be sold strategically. Under inte-
grated (segmented) markets, there is a possibility for a switch to a safe FA
12(risky RA). Given risk aversion, the result follows. Rest of the proposition
is intuitively straightforward.
Consider an emerging economy with segmented markets and ﬁnancial
repression. Proposition 2(a) implies that if this economy shifts to integrated
markets, then a∗ increases (since a∗
S < a∗




∂m > 0). So there are opposing eﬀects on investment in RAs.
Proposition 3 Assume that 0 < m < ρV [Y r
I ]. If an economy shifts from
segmented markets to integrated markets, and ﬁnancial repression is reduced
by 4m, then investment in ﬁnancial assets increases, provided
4m








∂m > 0 (Proposition 2(a)), there exists 4m, such that 0 <
4m < m, and a∗
I(m−4m) ≤ a∗
S(m), after using (15), and 0 < m < ρV [Y r
I ].
After substituting for a∗
I and a∗
S (see (15)), the result follows with ease. ||
Suppose that there is a shift from segmented markets to integrated mar-
kets, and there is also a reduction in ﬁnancial repression. Then investment
in ﬁnancial assets in the primary market will rise if the reduction in ﬁnancial
repression is adequate.
4 Discussion
In India, ﬁnancial repression in banks9 takes several forms. First, there
are excessive statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) and cash reserve ratio (CRR)
requirements, which reduce the interest income of banks. Second, there is
9Financial repression in ﬁnancial markets has reduced considerably after the substantial
policy changes in the last ten to ﬁfteen years.
13weak lender protection. Recovery of business loans by banks is diﬃcult,
despite the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act,
1993, and the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. Weak lender protection leads
to non-performing assets, encourages banks at times to invest in govern-
ment securities or in cash beyond the amount stipulated by regulation, and
encourages relatively safe housing loans beyond what is optimum. Third,
there are barriers to entry for new banks, and barriers to opening new bank
branches for existing banks. These barriers restrict competition.
Fourth, income on bank deposits beyond a point is taxed as interest
income, whereas income on bands is taxed as capital gains. This puts bank
deposits at a disadvantage relative to bonds in attracting the relatively more
wealthy people. Fifth, the administered rate of interest on savings accounts
and current accounts is low. To some extent, this encourages the use of
money market mutual funds at the expense of bank deposits. Sixth, banks
are eﬀectively not allowed to oﬀer indexed deposits (where the principal and
interest are linked to the price level). To some extent, this encourages the
use of gold. The reason is as follows. The importance of gold is usually
attributed to a strong taste for gold. However, it is possible that this taste
is partly for a simple, safe and liquid asset that is also a good hedge against
inﬂation, rather than for gold per se. If so, then indexed deposits in a good
bank can also satisfy the properties that gold has, and hence, can reduce
demand for gold to some extent. Seventh, in India, a borrower has, for all
practical purposes, no access to the judiciary even if she can prove that she
deserves to get a loan and has not got one from her bank (without eﬀectively
bribing the bank oﬃcials). Eighth, in practice, ﬁnancial repression is to some
extent related to the public sector character of most banks.
14There are several reasons why the Government of India may be reluctant
to reduce ﬁnancial repression. One reason is that the government’s ﬁscal
deﬁcit is high. Given its ﬁscal deﬁcit, the government needs assured access
to funds at reasonable rates of interest. There is also public pressure to
keep inﬂation under control. So borrowing from the Reserve Bank of India
can not go beyond a point. In this context, the government ﬁnds the SLR
(and even CRR) requirements on commercial banks useful. Moreover, it
needs an alternative to subsidies to help the priority sectors in the economy,
given its budget constraint. The policy of priority sector lending by banks
may be viewed as a second best policy. We conclude that a pre-condition
to reduce ﬁnancial repression in banks is to improve ﬁscal condition of the
government.
Usually people are risk averse and/or uninformed on trade in assets.
So banks are important because a bank deposit gives a ﬁxed return, and
is liquid (see Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990). Banks are also important for
borrowers, especially for emerging and non-reputed entrepreneurs. However,
this importance of banking does not get reﬂected in data. This is because
ﬁnancial repression in banks has reduced the return on bank deposits and
has led to less allocation of funds to deposits and more in favor of the stock
market, mutual funds, non-bank ﬁnance companies, micro-ﬁnance, and RAs.
The gap between the return on bank deposits and that on real estate is
not just due to ﬁnancial repression in banks. The return on real estate itself
is also high. We may, for simplicity, classify real estate into two categories -
urban and rural. It seems that the much talked about appreciation in price
is primarily in the case of urban (and expected to become urban) real estate.
Accordingly we will focus on urban real estate.
The usual reason given for impressive appreciation in real estate price is
15a rise in population, in incomes, and so on. This argument is not entirely
correct. The appreciation is to some extent due to government policy. The
reason is as follows. The average price of land in rural areas is a fraction
of that in urban areas, even after adjusting for the cost of ‘development’
in the case of urban real estate. The government has not approved the
use of land for urban development and has not built (or allowed others to
build) infrastructure in urban areas at the rate that is commensurate with
the needs of the economy. The impact of this is being felt more and more
over time. Hence, we have appreciation of the developed (and expected to
be developed) urban real estate. So the appreciation is not entirely market
driven in a rapidly growing economy. It is also an eﬀect of the regulatory
regime.
The appreciation in price of land has been impressive, and has motivated
our assumption in this paper that the gap between return on real estate
and that on bank deposits is positive. However, there are good reasons to
believe that the government policy on urban real estate may change. As
urbanization spreads, urban vote banks will increase and rural vote banks
will decrease. Also, it seems that the government is responsive to the needs
of the outsourcing industry. This industry is not just due to cheap and
skilled labor, but also due to cheap urban real estate in Tier II towns (cheap
relative to that in developed countries). If appreciation of land continues at
the rate witnessed in the recent past, then India may lose on this account
to some extent. So it is possible that the government will change policy in
various ways, as it has already to some extent in the recent past (see the
policy on special economic zones). Furthermore, it is only recently that we
are becoming really aware of the role of, what we may call, the government’s
license-permit-quota raj in real estate (see Glaeser, et al. (2005) for a related
16issue). If the change in policy occurs, then there will be more of urban real
estate that has infrastructure and is approved. Then the rate of appreciation
may fall.
Price of property is also a matter of conﬁdence. If conﬁdence in real
estate declines, then, there can be a fall of price. This also makes real estate
a risky asset. Self-fulﬁlling expectations play a role in this market. Further-
more, there is a noise trader risk, particularly in the case of upcoming cities,
which is where the bulk of pure investment and trading is. These features
of real estate market are not well understood. The result is that people
are taking a risk that they may not be able to deal with. This argument
is consistent with the theory and evidence in Behavioral Economics. It is
true that the forthcoming real estate investment trusts (REITs) can remove
some of the problems, but it is doubtful if they can solve all the problems.
In fact, diﬃculties due to noise traders may increase rather than decrease.
The formal model in this paper focused on one kind of RA viz., real
estate. However, an important RA in the context of India is an owner-
managed enterprise. We will discuss this brieﬂy to complete this discussion.
Owner-managed enterprises are associated with self-employment.
India is characterized by not only a high ratio of investment in RAs
to FAs, but also a high ratio of self-employment to, what we may call,
wage employment10. Pant et al. (2006) have shown that the two ratios are
related. The implication of their analysis is that to shift from RAs to FAs,
we also need a shift from self-employment to wage employment. After all,
10Wage employment is where a person is employed by somebody else for a ﬁxed wage,
unlike in the case of self-employment, where a person is employed by oneself and the
return is usually uncertain. Furthermore, wage employment does not involve capital,
whereas self-employment may require some capital.
17one cannot delegate only capital. It has to be accompanied by delegation of
labor. The former is a case of a shift from RAs to FAs, whereas the latter
is a case of a shift from self-employment to wage-employment.
Often the terms self-employment and entrepreneurship are used inter-
changeably. This is, however, incorrect. India has more than 50% self-
employment (Gupta, 2002). It is unlikely that all agents who are self-
employed are also entrepreneurs. It follows then that there is a need to
reduce self-employment and increase wage employment. Though the gov-
ernment is keen on the latter, there is hardly any mention of the former. It
is not easy to distinguish between an entrepreneur and a non-entrepreneur.
However, competition can be used as a procedure for discovery in the mar-
ket (Hayek, 1968). Businesses of those who are self-employed and have
entrepreneurial ability need to be allowed to grow, whereas the remaining
self-employed agents need to close down their owner-managed enterprises,
invest their wealth in FAs, and ﬁnd jobs with the entrepreneurs. This will
obviously lead to a fall in RAs and increase in FAs.
5 Conclusion
Our model incorporated ﬁnancial repression, and considerable use of black
money in some sectors of the economy, which leads to segmented markets. It
was shown that while both reduction of ﬁnancial repression and integration
of secondary markets increase expected utility, there are opposing eﬀects on
the portfolio choice between real assets and ﬁnancial assets in the primary
market. Reduction in ﬁnancial repression leads to an increase in investment
in ﬁnancial assets in the primary market, whereas integration of secondary
markets leads to a decrease in the same. Suppose that there is a shift from
18segmented markets to integrated markets, and that there is a reduction
in ﬁnancial repression. Then investment in ﬁnancial assets in the primary
market will rise if the reduction in ﬁnancial repression is adequate.
Real asset and ﬁnancial asset markets are somewhat segmented in India,
given the greater use of black money in real asset markets. This makes
a shift for existing investors from real assets to ﬁnancial assets diﬃcult.
However, this is only part of the problem, as was discussed in the previous
section. There are other obstacles too. So it will require a comprehensive
and sustained policy change on several fronts for quite some time. Having
said this, we hasten to add that the problem of a low ratio of ﬁnancial assets
to real assets is not insurmountable.
Another interesting theoretical result in this paper is follows. The stan-
dard lemon problem involves one strategic sale. In our model, we considered
two strategic trades - sale of one asset and purchase of another, possibly in
the same market. We observed that under some conditions, the price at
which strategic trade takes place is irrelevant.
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